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Abstract
The aim of this article is to provide a mid-term evaluation of liberalization
of electricity retailing in Europe taking into account some relevant analytic con-
straints: different and often conflicting theoretical points of view, shortage of
routinely collected data, problems in isolating the impact of single reforms in
power sector and pervasive regulatory interventions. Theoretical approaches and
empirical studies are discussed with the goal of testing the consistency of theory
and practice. Our analysis suggests that direct benefits of retail competition
have been often overstated, particularly for small and residential customers. Fi-
nal market has proven to be less dynamic than forecast and new entry in supply
more difficult to sustain in the medium-long run. Regulatory requirements are
demonstrated to be more significant than suggested in previous papers, due to
non-negligible market imperfections. Our main conclusion is that it seems un-
likely that “light-handed regulation” may fully substitute for “hard regulation”
in this sector, especially for small and residential customers. Moreover, direct
regulatory interventions remain essential for arranging and managing Default
and Last Resort services and avoiding the risk of excluding “vulnerable cus-
tomers” from trade. In the light of this limitations, further actions appear to
be required to give a thorough organization to this business able to let expected
outcomes of other related reforms (e.g. liberalization of generation) a stronger
impact on final customers’ welfare.
1
1 Introduction
In any industry the role of retailers is to provide final customers with added-value
services. The types and magnitudes of the costs and benefits of retailing adding-value
activities vary widely across sectors, final customer dimensions and characteristics,
periods, geographical locations and market structures.1 In the electricity industry,
retailers perform two main activities: on the one hand, they provide final customers a
complex service by aggregating inputs from all upstream actors (generation, transport
and distribution); on the other hand, they facilitate upstream firms’ sales by finding,
arranging and managing relationships with potential and actual buyers.
In the liberalization process of power sector, retailing and generation have been
opened to competition, whereas grid operation, maintenance and investments have
remained under regulatory oversight. In Europe the opening of retail electricity mar-
kets has progressively entitled eligible customers to freely purchase retail services from
a supplier of their choice: this right was first awarded to industrial consumers with
annual consumption above a certain threshold2 and then to all non-household con-
sumers from the 1st of July, 2004, followed by all consumers since the 1st of July,
2007. At present, almost all European countries have formally achieved the objective
of a fully open retail market.3
Before and during the process of liberalization several arguments have been put
forth on the costs and benefits of retail electricity competition. Despite the non neg-
ligible academic and political interest on this topic, there has never been a consensus
on the theoretical framework that should be used to examine retail activities in this
type of market. The lack of a shared vision has challenged the definition of a common
set of indicators for assessing the success or the failure of the reform. Two addi-
tional limitations have discouraged empirical impact analyses: on the one hand, the
scarcity of data on European retail markets which de facto impedes a systematic mar-
ket oversight; on the other hand, the difficulty of disentangling the effects of retail
liberalization from those of other related reform (e.g. liberalization of generation)
when using available data, such as final prices. On top of that, the powerful regu-
latory interventions in this business compound the evaluation of retail competition.
Indeed, liberalization goals of improving efficiency and effectiveness in electricity re-
tailing have been frequently counterbalanced, both at European and at national level,
by the political requirement of ensuring that no consumers were excluded from trade.
This objective has often been translated in the co-existence of market prices and regu-
lated tariffs, the latter being kept artificially low with a clear impact on competition’s
dynamics.
The aim of this article is to provide a mid-term evaluation of liberalization of
electricity retailing in Europe taking into account the mentioned analytic constraints:
different and often conflicting theoretical points of view, shortage of routinely col-
lected data, problems in isolating the impact of each reform, pervasive regulatory
interventions. The objective is twofold: drawing the attention to a relevant topic
which has been overlooked in recent debates on power markets and suggesting a set
of actions that should be undertaken by policy makers in order to give electricity
retail business a definitive and transparent status. In doing so we essentially answer
to the dilemma: coming back or going forth with liberalization of electricity retailing?
1Retailing activities add-value optimizing consumers’ allocations of time; increasing consumer
awareness of product features, price and quality; offering customer assistance; reducing searching,
switching, transportation, transaction and stock-out costs (Joskow, 2000).
2See Directive 96/92/EC.
3By 2009, Cyprus, Estonia (which was, however, subject to a transitional regime) and Hungary
had yet to achieve the goal of completely open retail markets (EC, 2011).
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Our analysis suggest that direct benefits of retail competition have been often over-
stated, particularly for small and residential customers. Final market has proven to
be less dynamic than forecast and new entry in supply more difficult to sustain in the
medium-long run, notably for small, non integrated companies. The disappearance of
captive market seems to have benefited more integrated generators willing to sell their
power to newly attracted customers than pure retailers competing on a retail margin.
At the same time European regulators seem to have proceeded without truly ques-
tioning liberalization paradigm, even when some shortcomings have revealed. They
lacked both the courage to let the market freely work and the strength to take a
step back when it did not [espandere con elementi fattuali delle ultime sezioni]. Our
main conclusion is that it seems unlikely that “light-handed regulation” may fully
substitute for “hard regulation”4 in this sector, especially for small and residential
customers. In the light of this limitation, further actions appear to be required to give
a thorough organization to this business able to let expected outcomes of other re-
lated reforms (e.g. liberalization of generation) a stronger impact on final customers’
welfare.
The discussion is organized as follows. In the next section we summarize the
theory on competition in electricity retailing. In the third section we provide an
overview of European retail electricity markets, using the few available data to test
some of the theoretical predictions. The fourth section is dedicated to the analysis
of market characteristics which may undermine the development of a sound retail
competition. In the fifth section we analyse Default and Last Resort services and
the implementation of protection mechanisms for “vulnerable customers”. The final
section contains the discussion of results and suggests the next steps that may be
taken to improve reform’s outcomes.
2 Retail electricity competition
The expected impacts of competition on electricity retailing are summarized in Table
1. Some of the benefits concern efficiency gains, while others are more related to




Direct gains on retail services
Indirect gains on wholesale, transport and
distribution services
Systemic gains (elimination of double
marginalization effect)
Differentiation
New offers and contractual arrangements




Innovative measuring and reading devices
Empowered equipment for quality services
Table 1: Expected impacts of retail electricity competition
4By “light-handed regulation”, we mean market monitoring and ex-post enforcement, while by
“hard regulation”, we mean ex-ante regulatory interventions.
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The academic debate on retail competition has generally been of a qualitative
nature5 although there have been some econometric attempts aimed at examining
consumer behaviour and at measuring the impact of retail competition on final prices.
2.1 Efficiency
Increasing competitive pressure on electricity retailers is likely to improve the effi-
ciency of retailing. Direct efficiency gains have two main sources: increased use of
cost-based pricing6 and a more efficient organization of retailing activities. Using
1996 data, Joskow (2000) estimates the potential savings for the average customer
in United States from switching to a competitive retailer that is responsible for all
retailing services7 and is able to provide them at a 25% discount compared to distrib-
utors. He finds that the average customer’s bill might be reduced by less than 1% or
approximately 2 dollars per month if the competitive retailer were to pass all of its
cost savings through to the customer.
In the same vein Ofgem, the British energy regulator, roughly calculates for differ-
ent payment methods8 the retail margin on which the entrants are supposed to under-
cut incumbents (2004). Littlechild (2005) provides a downward revision of Ofgem’s
estimates, mainly reflecting larger than forecast costs for credit cover and initial IT
and billing system settlement. The author concludes that the retail margin may
be positive only for direct debit contract, regardless the size of the entrant, while
is negative (small firms) or zero (large and medium sized firms) for standard credit
contracts. Finally, prepayment contracts may entail negative margins for all types of
new entrants. These estimates support Joskow’s opinion on the limited room for gains
coming from more efficient retail activities to be passed-through to final customers.
However, according to Littlechild (2000) efficiency gains may be more significant
because they may not only originate from direct retail operations but also from up-
stream procurement,9 which is estimated to account for approximately 50% of the final
retail price. Fierce competition for end customers may also place downward pressure
on transmission and distribution costs. Finally, from Littlechild’s perspective, over
time, market forces are able to reintroduce the proper incentives for dynamic effi-
ciency: with competition, only the best offers from the efficient suppliers can survive
and expand at the expense of unwanted contracts or/and inefficient sellers.
A last source of efficiency, which we may call systemic, has been envisioned in
the elimination of the double marginalization effect (Goulding et al., 1999). This
effect arises as a consequence of the vertical unbundling of supply activities along
the value chain when firms in different segments retain some degree of market power.
Economic theory states that when vertical relations do not exist, firms can exercise
their market power at all successive stages of the value chain, generating a negative
5The contributions of Borenstein and Holland (2005) and Joskow and Tirole (2006) are, to the
best of our knowledge, the only attempts to formalize models of retail electricity competition. In
these papers, the authors estimate the price distortions arising when competitive retailers are active
and settlement obligations for wholesale power purchases are determined on the basis of load profiles
when final customers do not react to real time prices. For models of retail competition in the gas
industry, see for instance Cremer et al. (2006) and Polo and Scarpa (2011).
6Real time pricing is one of the possibilities.
7It should be noted that, even after full unbundling, distributors will continue to be responsible
for, and thus will bear the costs of, some retailing services such as requests to connect, disconnect, or
change the level of service, resolve outages and power quality problems, and interface with competitive
retailers (Joskow, 2000).
8Standard credit, direct debit and prepayment.
9Littlechild (2000) provides some quantitative estimations of this effect in the United Kingdom,
while recognizing the inherent difficulty of such an exercise.
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impact on aggregate firm profits and on consumer welfare.10 From this perspective,
retail competition per se is perceived to be a positive element of liberalization reforms:
with retail competition, the double (retail) margin is eliminated or at least reduced.11
For the supporters of full retail competition, in principle efficiency gains may be
passed through to customers in the form of lower final prices. Some authors have
attempted to estimate the impact of reforms such as privatization and liberalization
on final prices and efficiency. See for instance Newbery and Pollitt (1997) on British
data, Steiner (2001) and Hattori and Tsutsui (2004) on OECD Coutries12 and Joskow
(2006) on US data. Joskow’s paper is the only one that properly accounts for retail
competition. The author compares changes in real electricity prices between 1996 and
2004 for US states that introduced retail competition and for those that have not. He
finds evidence that households in the states where the reform was adopted benefited
from larger reductions in prices (with the exception of Texas), while this trend is not
apparent for industrial customers. However, this result cannot be attributed tout court
to retail competition, as in the same period, several other reforms were implemented
in the electricity sector (increased competition in generation, improvements in the
regulation of distribution and transmission services, etc.).
On the downside, several authors agree that opening the market is likely to produce
larger advertising, promotional, transactional, and system duplication (e.g. billing or
customer assistance) costs, while there is no consensus on the final balance between
these costs and the benefits of competition.13 For instance, Littlechild (2000) finds
that in the long term, efficiency gains may offset increased advertising and promo-
tional costs, whereas Joskow (2000) and Defeuilley (2009) are more skeptical of this
prediction.
2.2 Differentiation and equipment innovation
Theoretically speaking, retail competition is expected to bring new offers and con-
tractual arrangements to the market and broaden the range of available services, such
as risk-hedging or energy management. Furthermore, competitive pressures on retail-
ers may indirectly force other actors, such as distributors or equipment providers, to
develop and install new measuring and reading devices and the equipment necessary
to improve service quality.
According to Joskow (2000) and Defeuilley (2009), the potential for product dif-
ferentiation and developments in the range of value-added services for which small
and residential customers are willing to pay an additional fee appears constrained in
the electricity industry. Empirical evidence in Europe partly contradicts this pes-
10The double marginalization problem may also be overcome by reestablishing vertical contractual
relationships between actors (with some sided-effects) or by using special types of contracts, e.g.,
two-part tariffs (Motta, 2004).
11An empirical paper by von Der Fehr and Hansen (2010) reveals that when fierce competition has
been introduced in Norwegian retail electricity market, firms has begun to behave as in a standard
Bertrand setting, which has ensured cost-reflective pricing, even in the presence of a small number
of competitors.
12The first paper presents a social cost-benefit analysis, while the others perform regressions using
panel data. Both approaches present specific limitations: cost-benefit analyses require the assessment
of a credible counterfactual; in the regressions, endogeneity issues are likely to arise.
13Advertising and marketing are useful tools for spreading information about products, prices
and competitors. However, a general mistrust toward electricity retailers, energy brokers and their
advertising campaigns endures, undermining the engagement of consumers and the gains from com-
munication (OFGEM, 2012b). Consumer attitude has been sometimes exacerbated by misleading
advertising campaigns which have been fined worldwide by competition authorities (see for instance
the cases of ENI in Italy and Airtricity in Ireland).
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simistic view on limited scope for product differentiation.14 Even though additional
services such as energy management were primarily demanded by larger customers,
competition in electricity retailing also stimulate the demand for new types of products
(mainly with green and dual fuel options) and innovative contractual arrangements for
pricing (wholesale price plus mark-up contracts, fixed-price contracts, standard vari-
able contracts, time-of-use contracts, and flat contracts) among small and residential
customers. The diffusion of these products remains nonetheless heterogeneous.15
The installation of smart metering and reading devices seems to represent an es-
sential condition for extending the range of products and services offered by electricity
retailers as well as for enabling an active demand side participation. Intelligent equip-
ments may foster the development of contracts with dynamic pricing options and the
adoption of more efficient consumption behaviours; moreover they may simplify the
process of billing and information exchange between retailers and distributors, with
a positive impact on competition dynamics.16 Even so the adoption of this new
technology seems to have been prompted more by binding legal framework than by
competitive forces.
Indeed it is the European Directive 2009/72/EC which has established that 80%
of total consumers should have been equipped with an intelligent metering system
by 2020. The decision to roll-out smart metering systems has been subject to a
preliminary economic assessment at national level, which has resulted in a variety
of coverage choices, technical designs and implementation schedules (ERGEG, 2013).
At present only Italy and Sweden have completed their roll-out with a 95% and 100%
coverage respectively17 while Belgium, Czech Republic, Portugal and Lithuania have
decided not to invest at all in smart meter deployment. This situation highlights
the lack of agreement on the final balance between costs and benefits of smart meter
adoption especially in the case of small and residential customers (on this debate see
for instance Le´autier, 2013).
3 Retail markets in Europe
A set of economic indicators may be used to test some of the theoretical predictions
regarding the outcomes of liberalized electricity retailing. We focus on the Euro-
pean Union because all Member States have adopted a common legal framework to
open both the wholesale and retail markets to competition. Therefore, if there are
country-specific aspects of retail competition, they reflect different realities in terms
of the generation mix, political and strategic objectives, and consumers’ attitudes and
awareness vis-a`-vis the market.
3.1 The supply side
On the supply side, liberalization reforms have allowed new firms to enter the market.
After a substantial amount of market entry in the first phase of liberalization, over
the whole 2003-2011 period, the total number of electricity retailers decreased from
14The analysis of the relationship between the numbers and types of available contracts and the
ability of consumers to seize the better market opportunities by switching supplier is postponed to
section 4.2.
15For a survey of newly introduced products, see for instance Von der Fehr and Hansen (2010) on
the Norwegian market and Littlechild (2002) on British market.
16Littlechild (2005) discusses in details the importance of metering and data communication in
the process of entry.
17In both cases the distributor is in charge for the roll-out and the investment is financed through
regulated tariffs.
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about 3379 to about 3242 (see Figure 3 in the Appendix). However, nearly half of
European countries have benefited from the opposite trend. The number of retailers
has slightly increased from 2010 to 2011.
In 2010, the figures for the main retailers, i.e. those accounting for at least 5%
of total national electricity consumption, reveal that only one country, Romania, has
eight big players, while the most numerous group of countries is characterized by
the presence of three main retailers.18 Detailed data are reported in Figure 4 in the
Appendix. These figures seem to indicate that the retail market has an oligopolistic
structure rather than a competitive one.19 From 2003 to 2010 the total number of
main retailers remained relatively constant, from about 102 companies in 2003 to 101
companies in 2010 (see Figures 5 and 6 in the Appendix).
Another relevant indicator of market structure is provided by the cumulative mar-
ket share of the main retailing companies. The difference between the total market
and the cumulative market share of the main retailers indicates the size of the residual
market, or the market available to minor competitors. The cumulative market share
of the main retailers in 2010 is reported in Figure 1.20
Figure 1: Cumulative market share of retailers (%), 2010.
Source: Authors’ elaboration on Eurostat data.
According to the size of the residual market, European countries can be classified
into three groups:
• Countries where the market covered by minor retail companies is large, i.e.,
between 45% and 65% of the total market: Germany (62.4%), Norway (52.2%),
Sweden (52.1%) and Italy (45%);
• Countries where smaller retailers cover between 35% and 20% of the total mar-
ket: Romania (33.2 %), Poland (29.7 %), Estonia (27%), Spain (27.4%), Nether-
lands (25%) and Hungary (22%);
• Countries characterized by a very narrow residual market: the more striking
cases are Ireland and Portugal (3%), Slovenia (1%) and Latvia (0.1%).
18The relevant market for retailers is the national market.
19Recall that in an oligopoly where firms compete a` la Bertrand, the presence of two firms is
sufficient to restore the market outcome of perfect competition.
20Denmark is excluded because of missing data; Finland does not report the information on the
cumulative market share of main retailers; in Netherlands only main retailers selling electricity to
small consumers are considered.
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Because the market for “minor competitors” is below 20% in 15 out of 26 of the
countries considered, the retailing industry in European countries can still be assessed
as highly concentrated. It is not possible to discern a clear trend in the cumulative
market share of main retailers between 2008 and 2010: the value of this indicator has
grown in 8 of the 26 countries, while it has remained unchanged in 4 countries. The
data are reported in Figure 7 in the Appendix.
The reduction in the total number of retailers has been justified in some cases by
unsuccessful entry attempts and in others by horizontal consolidations or acquisitions
of small retailers by larger and often vertically integrated firms.21
3.2 The demand side
On the demand side, the switching rate of final customers is a commonly used indicator
for the level of buyer commitment in a market: it calculates the number of end users
who decide to change suppliers when retail services are liberalized. The main idea
conveyed by this indicator is that if consumers can easily change service providers
when they wish to, producers are less prone to engage in exploitative behaviors, such
as imposing high final prices or low quality, and hence the market may be considered
more competitive.
Figure 2: Annual switching rate in the total retail market (%), 2008/2009.
Source: Authors’ elaboration on European Commission data.
Figure 222 indicates that Ireland and the Nordic Countries represent the most
active European electricity markets. Only Ireland, Sweden and the Netherlands had
switching rates above 10% during the period 2008/2009, while Finland, Norway and
Denmark reached the 5% threshold. France, Germany and Italy are next, with the
remaining European countries reporting switching rates close to zero. However, apart
21This trend suggests the presence of economies between retail and generation activities that would
favor the integration of upstream and dowstream businesses (Pollitt, 2008). If owning a retail firm has
the potential to increase generators’ investments by constraining overall business risk, the reduction
in the number of actors would lead to a higher level of concentration that may increase the retail
margin (Jamasb and Pollitt, 2005).
22Belgium, Estonia, Great Britain, Hungary, Poland and Spain are excluded because of missing
data; Cyprus, Lithuania and Malta registered zero switchings.
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from Austria, all countries exhibit a positive trend in the indicator over the considered
period.
The figures change if end users are classified into three categories according to
their consumption volume: large consumers, medium-sized industries, small indus-
tries and households.23 Large consumers have generally exhibited proactive behavior,
with 2009 switching rates ranging from 3,3% in Luxembourg to 73% in the Czech
Republic. Moreover, the percentage of meter points switching suppliers increased be-
tween 2008 and 2009 in all European countries except Austria, Germany, Italy and
Luxembourg. Similar figures are reported for medium-sized industries, with relatively
small magnitude. In this case, the 2009 indicator ranges from 0,008% in Bulgaria to
39% in Ireland. From 2008 to 2009, a positive overall trend is observable, with the
only exception being Austria. The participation of small industries and households in
the market has been substantially lower in almost all countries considered, with the
switching rate only exceeding the 10% threshold in Ireland (2009) and Italy (in 2008
and 2009). The trend in the indicator for this group of consumers is positive overall,
with the exception of a few countries.
Four considerations are noteworthy. First, there is no consensus on the level of
the switching rate at which the market can be considered “sufficiently competitive”.
Littlechild (2009) considers a residential customer switching rate of 10% a sufficient
threshold to justify the liberalization of retailing. To the best of our knowledge,
this is the only author providing a basis for comparison with real data. Second, the
switching rate registers the number of customers who have changed retailers, but does
not account for the number of customers who have chosen another contract offered
by their current supplier. This number also represents an indicator for customer
awareness that is not accounted for in official figures. Third, the difference in switching
rates between residential and large customers seems to indicate the presence of market
imperfections, and we address this issue in detail in the next section.
The most recent publicly available public figures, from 2009, reveal that 10 of
the 28 countries have opted for the complete removal of end-user price regulation,
while a few countries have only done so for non-residential consumers. Where tariffs
are available, a large share of final customers, both households and firms, continue
to purchase electricity under regulated conditions (EC, 2011). While it is true that
regulation and competition are two sides of the same coin, there is still no general
consensus regarding the necessity of eliminating end-user price regulations to allow
the retail market to operate effectively.
4 Competition with market imperfections
Some authors claim that the presence of market imperfections, such as switching
costs, informational complexity and a “consumer preference not to choose”, may affect
the outcomes of competition in the electricity sector, at least regarding small and
residential customers (Joskow, 2000; Brennan, 2006; Defeuilley, 2009). In addition,
the specific characteristics of electricity retail seem to undermine the expected benefits
of competition by generating negative externalities, such as customer’s segmentation
and innovation’s slowdown (Defeuilley, 2009).
In the following paragraphs, we present a summary of the main findings regarding
these issues. Some of these imperfections, such as informational complexities, seem to
require the implementation of some forms of “hard regulation”. From this perspective,
the “light-handed regulation” common in other liberalized industries does not seem
23Switching data by end user category are reported in the Appendix (Figures 8 to 10).
9
to be sufficient to ensure the proper operation of retail electricity markets.
4.1 Switching costs
Theoretically speaking, in markets characterized by repeated interactions between
buyers and sellers, a consumer who has previously purchased a product from a supplier
may incur costs when switching to a competitor, despite the firms’ products being
identical (Klemperer, 1995). Switching costs arise for the following reasons:
• searching costs to identify offers and the suppliers;
• learning costs to become familiar with the supplier;
• transactional costs to sign and resolve a contract.
Switching costs may be real or perceived and lead to a situation in which “prod-
ucts that are ex ante homogenous become, after the purchase of one of them, ex post
heterogeneous” (Klemperer, 1995). These costs prevent customers from changing sup-
pliers even if they are offered a better priced deal and thus have the same effects on
market dynamics as a barrier to entry. In the electricity industry, where consumers
have long-lasting supply relationships with the incumbent, switching costs may deter
complete consumer mobility, leading to under-switching despite the presence of sub-
stantial savings (Defeuilley, 2009). Moreover, the situation may be exacerbated if the
switching process is delayed or blocked by suppliers without specific reasons24.
Giulietti et al. (2010) analyze the influence of searching and switching costs in
the UK retail electricity market by studying the trend in price convergence between
new entrants and the incumbent. The authors find that, in line with the general
predictions of competition models with switching costs, even after the entry of new
competitors, incumbents are able to enjoy a consistent price advantage. Moreover,
new entrants, as soon as they are established in the market, tend to exploit the
presence of consumer searching and switching costs: over time, new firms’ incentives
to offer lower prices to gain additional customers are more than offset by the benefits
of keeping prices high to increase margins on previously served customers.
4.2 Informational complexities
In some sectors, consumers may also be unwilling to change suppliers because they
face relevant difficulties in evaluating and comparing suppliers’ offers. This might
be the case in the electricity industry, where consumers are generally offered two-
or multi-part tariffs, which reduce their ability to estimate the per-unit price of the
product. This situation might be further complicated if supply contracts contain other
advantages that cannot be straightforwardly translated into electricity price savings
(e.g., discounts on other purchases). This limitation may imply the following:
• consumers switch to a more expensive supplier (over-switching);
• consumers switch to a cheaper but not the cheapest available supplier (inaccu-
rate switching).
Errors in consumers’ switching decisions damage their welfare both directly, as they
cannot obtain the maximum surplus provided by existing retailers, and indirectly, by
increasing retailers’ market power due to a weakened relationship between firms’ sales
and surplus provision.
24Compare for instance Ofgem (2012a).
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Empirical evidence on electricity sector is provided in Wilson and Waddam-Price
(2005). The authors employ a sample of more than three thousand face-to-face surveys
of UK households, 13% of which has switched suppliers.25 They find that nearly 30%
of households switched to a more expensive supplier, while inaccurate switching led
customers to only obtain one forth of the gains available on the market. The paper
suggests that information overload and complexity may cause switching decisions to
be less efficient when the numbers of retailers and options in the market are large. As
a consequence, while increasing the number of competitors may have a positive effect
on the total gains available on the market, informational complexity may limit the
ability of consumers to exploit such gains, with a net negative impact of competition
on equilibrium final prices.
Recently, OFGEM (2012a), the British Regulator, published a package of propos-
als designed to eliminate, or at least reduce, informational complexities that constrain
households’ participation in electricity markets. The proposals include a limitation on
the number of tariffs that suppliers can offer and the types of tariffs (only two part-
tariffs are allowed), and impose specific layouts and contents for communications from
suppliers to consumers.
4.3 Consumer preference not to choose
In open opposition to the assumptions of the standard economic model, Brennan
(2006) attributes the likely scarce success of competition in retail electricity market
to the consumer preference for not making a choice, which can be considered a type
of market failure. While liberalized markets have forced consumers to make informed
choices that in turn presuppose increasing efforts at understanding and comparing
contract conditions and terms of trade, the experience in electricity, and previously
in telecommunication markets, seems to suggest that consumers in these sectors do
not always consider having additional options from which to choose an advantage.
Brennan’s opinion stems from an accurate analysis of the marketing literature which
indicates that consumers generally exhibit a limited propensity to revise their choices
or change the goods and services in their consumption bundles.
4.4 Customers’ segmentation
Some authors note that a possible side-effect of introducing competition in the retail
electricity market is the segmentation of active and passive customers (Defeuilley,
2009; von der Fehr and Hansen, 2010). Consumers are active in a market when they
exercise their freedom of choice by switching suppliers or by renegotiating their con-
tractual conditions without changing retailer. Differences in customers’ willingness
to switch suppliers or renegotiate contractual arrangements may create the potential
for a two-tiered retail market. In this case, active consumers who are consistently
involved in market dynamics may benefit from the introduction of competition in
retailing because they can obtain access to deals with prices that tend to be more
cost-reflective. The inactive customers, conversely, may end up paying prices that are
above their pre-liberalization levels, as firms may exploit consumers’ reluctance or
inability to switch to cross-subsidize their entry to the competitive sub-markets. Em-
pirical evidence from the Norwegian and United Kingdom markets seems to confirm
this prediction (OFGEM, 2007; OFGEM 2012b; Von der Fehr and Hansen, 2010).
25While the percentage of switching customers is in line with the national figure, the sample is
biased toward low-income customers.
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4.5 Innovative processes
According to Defeuilley (2009), some structural characteristics of the electricity in-
dustry may limit the opportunities for new entrants, which are supposed to offer price
reductions or quality improvements. The author suggests that a more careful analysis
of electricity provision reveals that scientific and technological opportunities for new
entrants in this retail sector are limited. Actually, investments in innovation seem to
be characterized by high levels of appropriability and cumulativeness at the firm level.
This implies that the innovative processes in this sector are likely driven by large es-
tablished firms, rather than by new entrants. Moreover, possibilities for innovation in
electricity retailing seems to be triggered more by equipment innovations (installation
of more sophisticated devices) or upstream choices (investments in renewable energy
sources) that are generally independent of competition in retailing, rather than by
radical innovations in business management (new information technologies, improved
customer management, etc.).
5 Regulation in competitive retail markets
In the previous section, we asserted that some direct regulatory interventions are
necessary to overcome the market imperfections in electricity retailing. Here, we argue
that the need for regulation does not disappear, even after achieving full competition.
Three situations are relevant here.
First, when competition is introduced in a market, customers can decide to switch
to a new supplier or can be passive and do nothing. In the latter case, the continuity of
supply can be ensured by assigning passive customers to a so called Default Supplier
(DS).26 As competition expands and more consumers participate in the market, de-
mand for the Default service should fall and nearly disappear in the long run. Second,
customers served by a competitive retailer may face the risk of being interrupted if
the supplier becomes unable to provide the service, for instance because it is insolvent
or bankrupt. In this case, regulators must arrange for the transition of customers to
a temporary supplier, the so called Last Resort Supplier (LRS), which ensures service
continuity. There may be a third group of customers, often called “vulnerable”, that
struggles to obtain a counterparty in the market, notably because these customers
are not profitable. The lack of profitability may depend on customers’ social and
economic backgrounds or on the costliness of supply. In the transition to competitive
retail markets, these customers face a serious risk of exclusion.
Each situation calls for a specific intervention. In the first two cases, the need to
provide an uninterrupted service may be counterbalanced by the objective of ensuring
a certain level of customer protection, especially in terms of price. A wide array of
implementation patterns are feasible, according to the relative weight placed on these
objectives and considering several possible providers (Table 2). In addition, three
procedures are available to assign these services to a retailer:
1. a direct “ex ante” entitlement, typically granted to the incumbent firm;
2. a random entitlement among the competitive suppliers;
3. a bidding process based on the competitive selection of the provider27.
26An alternative is the immediate disconnection of passive customers, but we do not consider this
hypothesis politically feasible.















Historic (cost) Consumer protection
Freely set price Real time Supply continuity
Retailer
All retailers (or only
the incumbent) offer
a tariff
Historic (cost) Consumer protection
Supplier resulting
from auction
Real time Supply continuity
Table 2: Patterns for the organization of Default and Last Resort services
For instance, when ensuring the continuity of supply is the only regulatory goal,
network system operator may provide Default and Last Resort services as part of
its balancing activity. Price formation occurs in real time: the consumers pay an
imbalance payment, which is generally burdensome, to discourage imbalances from
the day-ahed production plan. Conversely, if a regulator wishes to guarantee a high
level of customer protection, Default and Last Resort services may be offered at a
tariff and provided by a retailer or the local distributor.28 Note that each solution
presents specific advantages and drawbacks in terms of market distortions, political
sustainability, required regulatory oversight and enforcement.
The problem of “vulnerable” customers is slightly different and may be better un-
derstood within the Universal Service Obligations (USOs) framework. The primary
argument in favor of USOs has been a concern for full market coverage at reasonable
prices, including more costly market segments such as rural areas. Accordingly, some
obligations have been imposed on network service providers in the form of restrictions
on price discrimination (“non-discrimination”constraint) or obligations to provide the
service regardless a customer’s geographical location (“ubiquity” constraint). Often,
the two constraints have been combined, asking the firms to ensure full market cover-
age at a uniform price. Prior to liberalization, vertically integrated monopolies were
able to finance USOs by cross-subsidizing unprofitable and profitable market segments
in their customer portfolio.
From a theoretical perspective, when competition is introduced in markets with
profitable and unprofitable end users, new entrants only compete with the incumbent
for profitable customers, generating the so-called “cream skimming” phenomenon,
which challenges the incumbent’s ability to finance USOs through cross-subsidies
(Laffont and Tirole, 2000). Several authors (see for instance Anton et al., 2002;
Chone´ et al., 2000; Chone´ et al. 2002; Mirabel and Poudou, 2004) have attempted to
assess the welfare effects and distortionary impacts of different regulatory instruments
that governments may implement to allocate and finance USOs. However, none of
who temporarily lack a retailer can benefit from a “safeguard service”, the supply of which is assigned
for a period of two years to the winner of a reverse auction, where the participants offer to provide
the service at a mark up with respect to the wholesale price of electricity.
28When Default and Last resort services are offered at a tariff, they generate two distortions: the
first is to provide customers with inaccurate price signals for their withdrawals; the second is that
the tariff becomes the reference price for market contracts, i.e., the so called “price-to-beat”.
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these papers question the economic rationale behind keeping USOs in liberalized
markets. In particular, while the “ubiquity” constraint may continue to be imposed
on regulated network operators, “non-discrimination” constraint is at odds with the
concept of competitive markets with efficient cost-reflective prices.
Panzar (2000) stresses that there is an unavoidable trade-off between competition
and universal service provision in liberalized markets. If there is a need for a uni-
versal service policy, this means that the competitive market cannot deliver socially
acceptable allocations without direct public intervention. We argue that the need for
USOs exists if the transition to competitive retail markets may exclude “vulnerable”
or unprofitable customers from the trade of an essential good such as electricity. How-
ever, in line with ERGEG (2007), we suggest that to avoid the risk of exclusion more
targeted and less distortionary interventions are preferable, such as social tariffs29 or
direct transfers to customers.
5.1 Default Supplier, Last Resort Supplier and Universal Ser-
vice Obligations in Europe
In Europe, the application of DS and LRS regulations is highly heterogeneous. The
term Default Supplier does not appear in the European Directives, and ERGEG
(2009) reports that most European Countries (11 over 27) do not use this term in their
national regulations. When this term is employed, it generally refers to the provider
serving passive and “vulnerable” customers. Conversely, the Supplier of Last Resort is
explicitly mentioned in European Directives as the provider of Universal Service. The
majority of European Countries (20 out of 27) use this label to indicate the provider
serving customers whose retailer exited the market and “vulnerable” customers. It
is very common that the two terms are employed synonymously and that a unique
supplier is designated to ensure the continuity of supply in each of the three cases
examined above. When national regulations do not employ these labels, other forms of
interventions are designed to overcome the three possible situations where a retailer
is absent. DS and LRS are generally selected by the regulator: the incumbent is
generally the DS, while in the half of the countries it also performs the role of LRS.
The length of Default service provision is not temporarily limited in most countries,
and this fact may partly reduce customer awareness.
Universal Service provision is explicitly recognized in European Directives30 and
its implementation frequently coincides with end-user price regulation for small and
residential customers.31 In principle, the justification for end-price regulation seems to
rely on the need to reduce the exploitation of final customers resulting from retailers’
market power after the introduction of competition (Littlechild, 2000; OFGEM, 2002;
ERGEG, 2007). This interpretation requires the withdrawal of pricing restrictions
after the passage of the amount of time required to increase customer awareness and
29For instance, the duty of serving customers through social tariffs may be allocated to the local
distributor, to all retailers or to the incumbent.
30The Directive 2009/72/EC states, “Member States shall ensure that all household customers,
and, where Member States deem it appropriate, small enterprises, enjoy universal service, that is
the right to be supplied with electricity of a specified quality within their territory at reasonable,
easily and clearly comparable, transparent and non-discriminatory prices. To ensure the provision
of universal service, Member States may appoint a supplier of last resort”.
31The French government, for instance, in 2010 passed the NOME law, which prescribes the
complete removal of tariffs for industrial customers beginning in June 2011 and allows residential
customers to choose between signing contracts at market prices or being supplied by the incumbent
firm, EDF, at regulated tariffs through to 2015, when all end-user regulated tariffs will disappear.
The law also entitles competitive retailers to withdraw a share of EDF nuclear generation at a
regulated price to supply final consumers. For further details see Creti et al. (2013).
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to stimulate the entry of retailers.
Nevertheless, there is no consensus regarding the necessity to withdraw electric-
ity tariffs to allow the market to operate effectively. For instance, Va´squez et al.(2006)
maintain that a permanent, well-calculated tariff including a shopping credit32 achieves
the objective of guaranteeing the supply to all customers without deterring consumer
switching. Other authors such as Joskow (2000) and Littlechild (2000) are more
skeptical of the benefits of including a shopping credit in regulated tariffs. It is likely,
however, that consumers may be deterred from switching and new entry may be
hampered if tariffs do not reflect the underlying costs (Joskow 2006; EC, 2007).
6 Discussion and conclusions
We proposed a comprehensive analysis of liberalization in electricity retailing using
the European Union as case study. Despite several attempts to analyze retail market
dynamics, there is still a lack of consensus on the type of theoretical framework that
should be used to study competition in this segment. We fill this gap by highlighting
the main economic dimensions on which competition is expected to have a relevant
impact.
The estimation of competition effects over small firms and households represents
the most controversial point in the academic debate. The presence of market im-
perfections, such as switching costs or informational complexities, seems to limit the
possibilities for end users to fully engage in the market. As a consequence, the seg-
mentation of active and passive customers may occurs, thereby hampering the process
of developing effective competition. To overcome these limitations, we argument that
some forms of “hard” regulation may still be required.
Furthermore, we show that the introduction of competition in electricity retailing
requires ex-ante regulation of Default and Last Resort services. We present a complete
array of implementation models and discuss their advantages and drawbacks. Finally,
we assess the case for Universal Service in competitive retail markets and suggest less
distortionary interventions to avoid the risk of customer exclusion.
The data and the figures on European Union have revealed that the transition
to a completely competitive retail market remain an ongoing process. Altough new
firms are active in the market, the supply is still highly concentrated in the hands of
a few large operators. Relatively low switching rates for small firms and residential
customers demonstrate the limited engagement by this group of end users. From a
policy perspective, our analysis suggests that further steps should be taken and that
we are far from eliminating direct regulation in this sector.
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Appendix
Figure 3: Total number of electricity retailers to final consumers, 2003-2011.
Source: Authors’ elaboration on Eurostat data.
Note: Finland and Germany only present estimated figures; in Spain distribution companies were
included in the number of electricity retailers to final customers until the end until end of June
2009.
Figure 4: Number of main retailers, 2010.
Source: Authors’ elaboration on Eurostat data.
Note: Denmark is excluded because of missing information; in Netherlands only main retailers
selling electricity to small consumers are considered.
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Figure 5: Number of main electricity retailers, 2003-2010.
Source: Authors’ elaboration on Eurostat data.
Figure 6: Number of main electricity retailers, 2003-2010.
Source: Authors’ elaboration on Eurostat data.
Note: Some information about Denmark are missed; in Netherlands only main retailers selling
electricity to small consumers are considered.
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Figure 7: Evolution of cumulative market share of main retailers (%), 2008/2010.
Source: Authors’ elaboration on Eurostat data.
Note: Denmark and Finland are excluded because of missing information.
Figure 8: Annual switching rate for large industry (by eligible meter points; %), 2008-2009.
Source: Authors’ elaboration on European Commission data.
Note: Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Great Britain, Greece, Hungary, Norway, Poland,
Spain and the Netherlands are excluded because of missing data; Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta
and Slovenia have registered zero switchings.
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Figure 9: Annual switching rate for medium sized industry (by eligible meter points; %), 2008-2009.
Source: Authors’ elaboration on European Commission data.
Note: Belgium, Estonia, Finland, France, Great Britain, Hungary, Poland, Spain and the
Netherlands are excluded because of missing data; Cyprus, Lithuania and Malta have registered
zero switchings.
Figure 10: Annual switching rate for small industry and households (by eligible meter points; %), 2008-2009.
Source: Authors’ elaboration on European Commission data.
Note: Belgium, Finland, Hungary, Poland and Spain are excluded because of missing data;
Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Malta have registered zero switchings.
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